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STATE OF UTAH, 
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BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a criminal case in which the defendant 
was charged with having in his possession a dangerous 
weapon after having been convicted of a crime of violence, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503 (1953). 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The defendant was found guilty, by a jury of 
the crime of possession of a dangerous weapon by a 
convicted person, after trial of the matter before the 
Honorable J. Robert Bullock, Judge of the Fourth Judicial 
District Court. 
RELIEF SOUGHTON APPEAL 
Respondent respectfully seeks an affirmance 
of the trial court decision. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The defendant in this case was found guilty 
by a jury of the crime of possession of a dangerous 
weapon after having been convicted of a crime of 
violence in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503 
(1953). 
The first element of this crime is a prior 
conviction: On December 21, 19 72, the defendant, 
Parley Edward Nielsen, was convicted by a jury of the 
charge of assault with a deadly weapon (T.ll). 
Defendant was later sentenced to the Utah State Prison 
pursuant to the requirements of the statute and was 
later paroled from said prison. 
On December 7, 1974, the defendant visited Al's 
Lounge in Pleasant Grove, Utah (T. 40). 
The defendant then got in an argument with a man 
named Wayne Adams (T. 35-36). 
The defendant then requested a Mr. Craig 
Smith to take him home (T. 41). After the defendant 
changed clothes Mr. Smith gave the defendant a ride 
back to the lounge (T. 41). At this time Mr. Smith 
testified that the defendant was in possession of a 
clip to a gun (T. 42). The proprietor of the bar 
testified that he saw what he thoughtwas a gun in the 
possession of the defendant (T. 52). Craig Brackenburg, 
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a witness, testified that he saw a gun in the hand 
of the defendant (T. 66). Another witness, Evelyn 
Ekins, testified that she also saw a gun in the hand 
of the defendant (T. 78). Mrs. Ekins also testified 
that she heard the defendant tell Mr. Kent Gurney, 
the owner that if he called the police, that he 
(the defendant) would kill him (T. 87) . Defense 
counsel introduced testimony of other witnesses that 
testified that they did not see the defendant in 
possession of a gun (T. 114, 118). 
However, it is the function of the jury to 
determine the credibility of witnesses as the trier 
of fact and it should be presuraed that the jury carried 
out this function properly. A verdict of guilty was 
returned and the defendant was sentenced to the Utah 
State Prison. 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NUMBER 6. 
The defendant was charged with violation of 
Section 76-10-503, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, entitled 
"Possession of Dangerous Weapon by Convicted Person, 
Drug Addict, or Mentally Incompetent Person Prohilited." 
The pertinent language of the statute is as follows: 
"Any person who is not a citizen 
of the United States, or any person 
who has been convicted of any crime of 
violence under the laws of . . . the 
State of Utah . . • shall not own or 
have in his possession or under his cus-
tody or control any dangerous weapon as 
defined in this part. Any person who 
violates this section is guilty of a 
class A misdemeanor, and if the dangerous 
weapon is a firearm or a sawed-off shot-
gun he shall be guilty of a felony of the 
third degree." 
In instructing the jury as to the law set forth 
in the above section of the Utah Criminal Code, the 
Court gave instruction number 6: 
"Instruction No. 6 
"The essential elements of the crime 
charged in the information are as 
follows: (1) That the defendant 
had a gun in his possession on or 
about December 7, 19 74; (2) That 
sometime previously he had been con-
victed of a crime of violence under 
the laws of the state of Utah. 
"If you believe that the evidence 
establishes both of the above elements 
of the offense beyond a reasonable 
doubt, it is your duty to convict 
the defendant; if the evidence has 
failed to so establish either of 
said elements, then you should 
find the defendant not guilty." 
Instruction 6 is basically a restatement 
of the elements charged in the information which does 
not constitute reversible error. 
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In Wellman v. Noble, 12 Utah 2d 35 0, 366 P. 2d 
701 (1961), the Utah Supreme Court stated the purpose 
of instructions to the jury. It held that, "The 
purpose of instructions is correctly to present facts, 
necessary to be determined, and applicable principles 
of law in a clear and understandable manner." 
The court went on further to state that: 
"When the error assigned is the 
giving or failure to give instructions, 
the real inquiry should be were the 
issues of fact necessary to be determined 
and the principles of law applicable 
thereto, correctly presented to the 
jury in a clear and understandable 
manner?" 
In our case the court told the jury in clear 
and unmistakable language of the elements of the crime 
needed to find the defendant guilty. 
Appellant contends that the use of the word 
"gun" instead of "dangerous weapon" is prejudicial. 
In Instruction 6 the court merely restated the charges 
in the information. The key language which prevents 
appellant from being prejudiced is: 
"If you believe that the evidence 
establishes both of the above elements—" 
The use of the word "gun" cannot be prejudicial because 
the jury is surely aware of the charges against the 
appellant. 
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In Johnson v, United Pacific Insurance Company, 
11 Utah 2d 279, 358 P.2d 337 (1961), the court held that: 
"While court may not comment upon 
evidence in jury trial this does not 
mean that court cannot mention the 
evidence or the facts, and what must 
be avoided is commenting upon evidence 
in such a way as to indicate an opin-
ion as to what the facts are on dis-
puted issues." 
In the instant case the use of the word "gun" 
does not indicate an opinion of what the disputed facts 
are, it is merely a restatement of the charges in the 
information. 
The court in Johnson, supra, went on further 
to state that: 
"We recognize that our law 
does not allow the court to comment 
on the evidence in jury trials. 
However, this does not mean that 
he cannot mention the evidence or 
the facts. The instructions cannot 
be prepared in a vacuum, nor given 
wholly in the abstract. In order 
to make them realistic and under-
standable they should be correlated 
to the issues of fact involved in 
the particular case. This some-
times requires reference to the 
evidence and the claims of the 
parties, and there is no harm in 
doing so. What must be avoided 
is commenting on the evidence in 
such a. way as to indicate an opin-
ion as to what the facts are on 
disputed issues. Viewed in that 
light we see no error in the instruc-
tion complainedof." 
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Even if it was error, and the words "dangerou^ weapon" 
instead of "gun" should have been used; respondent 
contends that it was harmless error, because in light of 
the facts in the instant case, and not giving the instructions 
in a vacuum as enunciated in the Johnson case, the jury was 
still left to determine whether the appellant in fact had a 
gun. Instruction No. 6 does not imply that the court has 
concluded or given an opinion on the disputed facts of this 
case; therefore, instruction 6 does not amount to prejudicial 
error. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN DENYING APPELLANT'S 
REQUESTED INSTRUCTION; AND IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NUMBER 7 
BECAUSE A PISTOL IS A DANGEROUS WEAPON PER SE UNDER THE FACTS 
OF THIS CASE. 
In Section 76-10-501, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, the 
words "dangerous weapon" and "firearm" are defined. In sub-
paragraph 1 of said section the definition of dangerous weapon 
appears and the language is as follows: 
"Dangerous weapon means any item that 
in the manner of its use or intended use 
is capable of causing death or serious bodily 
injury. In construing whether an item, object, 
or thing not commonly known as a dangerous weapon 
is a dangerous weapon, the character of the 
instrument, object, or thing; the character 
of the wound produced, if any; and the manner 
in which the instrument, object, or thing was 
used shall be determinative." 
In subparagraph 2 of said section, the word "firearm" 
is defined as follows: 
-7-
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"Firearms means pistols, revolvers, 
sawed-off shotguns, or sawed-off rifles, and/ 
or any device that could be used as a weapon 
from which is expelled a projectile by any 
force.'1 
The Court in this case gave the following instruction: 
"Instruction No. 7 
"For your purposes in determining 
guilt or innocence of the defendant, 
assault with a deadly weapon is a crime 
of violence, and a pistol-type handgun 
is a dangerous weapon under the laws of 
this state. However, a gun clip alone 
with or without cartridges in it is not 
a dangerous weapon within the meaning 
of the law under which the defendant 
is charged." 
Appellant contends that a pistol is not a dangerous 
weapon per se and, therefore, the following instruction 
should have been given: 
"Instruction No. 1. You are instructed 
that a dangerous weapon means any item 
that in the manner of its use or 
intended use is capable of causing 
death or serious bodily injury. You 
are further instructed that in con-
struing whether an item, object, or 
thing not commonly known as a dangerous 
weapon is a dangerous weapon, the 
character of the instrument, object, 
or thing and the manner in which the 
instrument, object, or thing was used 
shall be determinative." 
The requested instruction was properly denied because 
it does not reflect the correct applicable law. 
Instruction 7, given by the court in the instant case 
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is proper because under this statute a pistol should 
be construed as a dangerous weapon per se. 
Statutes prohibiting the carrying or possessing 
of dangerous or deadly weapons apply to weapons which 
in their intended or readily adaptable use are likely 
to produce death or serious bodily injury. 94 C.J.S. 
Weapons § 6. Under these statutes it is unlawful to 
possess firearms even though unloaded. 94 C. J.S. 
Weapons § 6. 
In State v. Quail, 28 Del. 310, 92 A. 859 ( 1914) , 
the court stated that it is immaterial whether the pistol 
is loaded or not because such an instrument is commonly 
regarded as a deadly weapon. It is the manifest policy 
and intent of the law to prevent carrying of such 
deadly weapons. 
The court in Quail, supra, states that, "If 
we should sustain the contentions of the defendant we 
fear that many persons would carry a pistol unloaded 
but at the same time have bullets secreted upon their 
person to be used if desired." 
This theory is advanced by recent case law 
wherein the court in State of Kansas v. Omo, 199 Kan. 
167, 428 P.2d 768 (1967) held that a defendant could be 
convicted of unlawful possession of a pistol without a 
specific showing that the weapon was actually capable 
of being fired since a pistol is a deadly weapon per 
se. 
This decision was upheld in State of Kansas 
v, Sullivan, 210 Kan. 842, 504 P.2d 190 (1972). 
Appellant contends that there is a division 
of authority on whether a handgun or pistol should 
be considered a dangerous weapon per se. This is not 
an accurate assessment of the law when a state has 
a statute prohibiting ex-convicts from possessing 
dangerous weapons. In these cases the state has a 
much stronger obligation to protect society. The 
statute under consideration was directed toward the 
safeguarding of the public peace and security and 
is a proper exercise of the police powers. There is 
no authority allowing an ex-convict to possess a commonly 
known dangerous weapon such as a gun, because it is 
unloaded. Even though Utah has not specifically 
decided this issue in case law, it appears that the 
legislature determined that possession of firearms 
by ex-convicts was harmful by drafting the appropriate 
legislation. The statute makes the narrow classification 
of ex-convicts; in the interest of public policy, 
security would be better served by construing a pistol 
in the possession of an ex-convict as dangerous per se. 
Therefore, the court in our case denying appellantfs 
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requested instruction and giving instruction 7 uses 
sound discretion and afforded appellant a non-prejudicia 
fair trial. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent contends that the trial court was 
correct in giving instructions number 6 and 7 because 
they recite the applicable law to be applied to the 
issues of this case. Neither instruction 6 or 7 amount 
to reversible, prejudicial error. The language of 
Section 76-10-501 in conjunction with Section 76-10-503 
does not require a consideration of whether the gun was 
loaded in this particular case. A gun in the possession 
of an ex-convict, in a public lounge, is a dangerous 
weapon per se for the protection of the public. 
Respondent respectfully submits that defendant was not 
prejudiced but received a fair trial and the decision 
of the lower court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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